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Abstract:  
This paper analysis corruption in Pakistani courts especially in the 
criminal justice. The data comes mainly from my fieldwork in Misalpur 
a village in central Punjab and its responsible police station and 
district courts. Following hermeneutic strategy corruption has been 
analyzed as a cultural system. In other words corruption has been 
explained in the light of cultural values of the Punjabi society.  
 
My assumption is that corruption is the result of difference between the 
local cultural values and the philosophy of the state. Theoretically 
Pakistan is a legal state. The basic values of the state law of Pakistan 
enshrined in the basic rights which are part of the Pakistani 
Constitution are equality and justice. The basic values of the Punjabi 
society are its kinship base and hierarchy of the social status. In other 
words this means that the society is dominantly organized on kinship 
lines i.e. absolute and unquestioned loyalty and commitment to 
relatives. Similarly according to the local culture people are not equal 
in their social status. Owning to the first characteristics relatives help 
each and as a result of the second justice is not absolute it is according 
to the status of the disputants. Summarized it can be said that 
corruption is the price that is paid for making the official system of 
justice function according to the values of the society. The real problem 
therefore is not bribery but safarish (nepotism, patronism especially 
intervention on behalf of a relative). This draws from the fact that the 
primary responsibility of person is towards her/his relatives and not the 
state and its laws. 
 
Achieving corruption free Pakistan (Punjab) is not possible merely by 
making and implementing strictly laws. It has to accompany uniform 
and universal state socialization i.e. school education. In the long run 
values of the society have to be replaced by the values of the state. 
 
 Almost everybody in Pakistan says that corruption is its biggest problem. It is 
considered the root cause of all its problems.  Poverty, illiteracy, terrorism, shortage 
of electricity, food, lack of governance, etc. have there origin here.  To make matters 
worse, corruption in Pakistan has been continuously on the rise. For example, 
according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, in 2010  
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Pakistan was ranked 34th compared to 2007 when it was ranked 42nd. Corruption is  
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found in almost all the departments and institutions of the government. According to 
the National Corruption Survey conducted by Transparency International in 2002 
and in 2006, the three most corrupt government agencies were the police, the 
political sector, and the judiciary. The same survey noted that “100 percent of the 
respondents who had any type of contact with the police over the previous year were 
confronted with corruption”. In spite of the gravity of problems it causes, almost no 
serious attempt has been undertaken to understand corruption. This paper is an 
attempt to explore the ways and reasons of corruption in Pakistan. The criminal 
justice system, i.e. the police and the courts, is especially focused upon in this paper.  
 
 The Geertzian interpretative paradigm is used as a theoretical framework for 
this paper. Ethnography for Geertz is “an elaborate venture in (…) thick 
description”, which is about “thinking and reflecting” and “the thinking of thoughts” 
(Geertz 1973: 6). He elaborates further that “doing ethnography is like trying to read 
(in the sense of ‘construct a reading of’) a manuscript (…)” (Geertz 1973: 10). This 
attempted reading according to Geertz’s view is “intrinsically incomplete” (Geertz 
1973: 29). Following this approach he defined law as “local knowledge”, i.e. “(….) 
vernacular characterizations of what happens connected to vernacular imaginings, 
stories about events cast in imagery about principles (…) and not placeless 
principles” (Geertz 1983:215). In other words, for Geertz law has to be embedded in 
the local cultural context for “giving particular sense to particular things at particular 
places” (Geertz 1983: 232). This he has also called “law as culture system”  
Lawrence Rosen, a lawyer turned anthropologist from USA and a student of Geertz, 
applied this approach to the study of law courts in Morocco. He noted that courts 
reflect the cultural characteristics of the broader society comparable to the way a 
monastery, a market centre, or a men’s club does. 
 
“When, therefore, a case actually comes up for a hearing, the mode 
of fact-finding and the form of judicial reasoning employed by the 
qadi reveal that they are closely related to the patterns of thought 
and action found in culture at large” (Rosen 1989: 309).   
 
Hence corruption in Pakistani criminal justice, following this approach, can be seen 
as the functioning of the Pakistani state law embedded in the Pakistani culture. Since 
the data mainly comes from the Punjab we will analyze it as a case study of the 
Punjab. Let me start by concentrating on two main values of Punjabi culture: 
I its kinship base: The single most dominant and determining social 
relationship in the Punjab is kinship, so much so that one can call it a kinship-
dominated society. 
II the hierarchical nature of social relationships: in other words, the structure of 
human relationships in the Punjab is hierarchical. 
 
 The two most basic values of the state law of Pakistan enshrined in the 
fundamental rights which are part of the Pakistani Constitution are equality and 
justice. The Pakistani State is supposed to be a legal state, i.e. based on the rule of 
law. In the following I want to argue that Punjabi society and the Pakistani State are 
based on two different sets of values and philosophies. In a society organized purely 
along kinship lines the central value is absolute and unquestioned loyalty and 
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commitment to relatives, to the agnates for example – the central principle being the 
nearer a relative the more cohesion, solidarity and claims of favor, something based 
on the principle known in anthropological literature as fission and fusion. In a purely 
‘legal state’, on the other hand, it is the rule of law. These rules are supposed to be 
logical, i.e. they have a scientific base and are above all the same for all. The state is 
run by bureaucrats who are selected to their posts by fair rules, and it is their duty to 
implement laws impartially. They are accountable for whatever they do and above 
all can be removed from their position in accordance with prescribed rules. The 
primary commitment and loyalty of the bureaucrats is to the state. 
 
 These may be called the two ideal models. Most of the societies of the world 
are mixed societies. There are some societies that are predominantly kinship based, 
and there are others that are nearer the rule of law model. Pakistani Punjabi society is 
a kinship-dominated society. Nobody can imagine refusing the request of close 
relatives like one’s father, mother, or brother for example. There is social pressure 
on relatives to help each other. It is on relatives that people depend or can fall back 
on in case of any emergency, and problems including the quarrels, fights, crimes, 
and the like. Bureaucrats in general work more as protectors of their families and 
kinships and not as the implementers of the rules of the state. The police, judges, 
lawyers, or others serving in the court have as their first priority the commitment to 
their families. Villagers go to the police and courts in the form of groups mainly 
consisting of relatives. The first questions asked after reaching the police station, the 
court, etc. are the names of the biradari (patrilineage), relatives, families and 
villages of the people in question. A whole net-work of who’s who of the concerned 
officials is traced. This is done to find common relatives and friends who can 
support the claimants.  
 
 The English expression corruption can be translated by two Urdu/Punjabi 
words combined: rishwat and safarish. Rishwat (bribery) means the paying/receiving 
of a sum of money or something of valuable for doing or getting something done 
illegally or dishonestly. In safarish payment of money or valuables is replaced by the 
use of social relationships to achieve something illegal. It is important to mention 
here that safarish and rishwat in Pakistan is not required for doing only something 
illegal or dishonest; almost nothing functions without it, and it is also required for 
doing and getting rightful and legal services. The basic problem in my view is not 
rishwat but safarish. Safarish seems to be the most ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ way of 
doing things in Pakistan. People do not even realize that they are doing anything 
wrong. It is actually the other way round; a person who does not entertain the 
safarish of his relative or does not do safarish for her/her relatives is generally 
considered an arrogant and an asocial type and hence is in the wrong. You can find 
any number of examples of this in everyday behavior. In cases of a conflict the close 
relatives, particularly, and other relatives, generally, are on the same side by default 
irrespective of the question of right or wrong. Commitment to relatives, especially 
close ones, is unquestioned. Members of a biradari will support each other against 
the members of other biradari even when there are minor disputes within the 
member’s biradari. A Punjabi saying goes: “the thinnest blood is thicker than 
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water”21. If a choice has to be made between a relative and a friend, it is almost 
exclusively the relative chosen. That the kinship is the most fundamental of all the 
social relationships in the Punjab is also evident from the fact that kinship terms are 
used to express all other relationships. In the village all people older than the speaker 
are addressed by kinship terms like uncle, grandfather, mother’s sister, father’s 
sister, etc. for example. If a person wants to express a special bound with an 
unrelated person he will be called a brother/sister. Fast friends are declared sisters by 
women and brothers by men.  
 
 The underlying principle behind social status and hierarchy, which I have 
named as the second basic value of rural Punjab life, is that human beings are not 
considered equal in the eyes of the society. This aspect has been well documented in 
the relevant ethnographic literature on the Punjab (Chaudhary 1999 and 2006, Saghir 
Ahmad 1977, S. M. Lyon 2004, Hamza Alavi 1972, Huma Haq 2000). The 
population of the Punjab in general and the village population in particular are 
divided into a number of biradaris that have different positions on the hierarchy 
scale. Biradari, literally translated means brotherhood, could be defined as a group 
consisting of people who trace a common ancestor; in short it is a patrilineage. 
Biradari, as has already been stated above, is perhaps the single most important 
determinant of all the types of social relationships (marriage, death, gift exchange, 
etc.) in the rural areas. The most important characteristics of these biradaris are said 
to be equality and fraternity within the same biradari but hierarchy and inequality 
between them. 
 
 The clearest manifestation of the hierarchical division of Punjabi biradaris is 
between zamindar (farmers) and kami (artisan). There are no opposing opinions 
about the lower social status of the kamis. There is for instance no commensality 
between the farmers and artisan groups in the village. Kami will prepare the smoking 
pipe of the farmer but cannot smoke it in the company of the farmers. The village 
household servants who are as a general principle kami have their own separate 
eating utensils. There is no marriage between zamindar and kamis, especially 
between zamindar females and kami males (hyper-gamy being the rule in the 
Punjab). There may, similarly, be differences of opinion about which of the village’s 
farmer biradari stands on the top of the social ladder, but the general consensus 
seems to be that even the different farmer birdaris are not equal in status. Similarly 
there is hierarchy among the different kami biradaris. The very first question a 
Punjabi asks a person he’s just met is: Tusi kaun hunde ho (literally translated: who 
are you? In actuality it is an enquiry about the family and biradari of the addressed 
person). This question is neither meant nor taken as an insult. The speaker wants to 
fix the status and position of the new contact so as to behave accordingly. 
Misunderstandings could be embarrassing for both sides. It is significant to mention 
that money and resources are not the sole indicator of the social status of biradaris.  
 
 This comes perhaps from the Hindu past of Punjabi society. One of the basic 
characteristics of Hindu culture and religion is its caste system. These castes are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  The original Punjabi sayings: “Khoon patla bhie howay tee pani naloon ghehra honda aee”. The 
second similar proverb is: “Apna mar ke bhie shan which sit da aee”.  
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hierarchically ordered, and people born into them inherit their status.Cohn, a British 
legal Anthropologist who did fieldwork in India, wrote: “(…), men are not born 
equal, and they have widely differing inherent worth. (…) The Chamar (cobbler) 
knows he is not equal to the Thakar (landlord)” (Cohn 1967: 155). This hierarchical 
character of the Punjabi society is directly related to the law. Geertz wrote, for 
instance, about the Hindu caste system being equally relevant for the Punjab: 
 
“What distinguishes the Indic legal sensibility from others is that right 
and obligation are seen as relative to position in the social order, and 
position in the social order is transcendentally defined” (Geertz 1983: 
198).  
 
 If we consider law as a reflection of the culture in which it is implemented, 
the customary law practices in Punjabi rural areas are clear evidence of the 
hierarchical nature of relationship in the Punjab. I have, therefore, called customary 
law of the Punjab as a ‘relative justice’ (i.e. justice according the status and position 
of the disputants) in my previous publications. There were a number of very clear 
demonstrations of this in the village in which I conducted my fieldwork. In one case 
the daughter of a farmer eloped with the son of a tailor. According to Punjabi 
marriage rules (hypergamy), a woman cannot be given in marriage to someone of a 
lower social category. There was a full-village gathering, called kath, outside of the 
village. The family of the tailor had already fled the village. Their house was burned 
down, and it was decided to give the family when found, especially the boy, an 
exemplary punishment. In official law, if a woman and man want to marry they can 
do so irrespective of their biradari. According to the local customs it is the 
responsibility, on the one hand, and the privilege, on the other hand, of the 
parents/family to arrange the marriages of their children, especially of their 
daughters. A woman deciding to run away with a man (called nikal jana in Punjabi), 
or a man taking away a woman (known as kad ke le jana in Punjabi), are ideally both 
to be killed, with the minor difference that in the first case both the man and the 
woman are punished and in the second case only the man. It also depends upon the 
biradari of the woman and the man. In case of an elopement of a kami woman with a 
man of the farmer biradari, even her abduction may not lead to any punishment. 
There were countless examples of sexual relations of the farmers with kami women, 
but no one bothered about them. In another case, the house of a village smith cum 
carpenter was broken into by youth of the zamindar. They intended to teach a lesson 
to their smith, who in their view had become arrogant and had stopped taking an 
interest in his customary work of repairing the agricultural tools of the farmers based 
on the sepi system (payment at the end of cropping season). Everybody in the 
village, including the smith himself, knew who broke into the smith’s house, but 
nothing happened as a result. The smith did not even go to the police.  
 
 Though the focus of this paper is not the functioning of the traditional system 
of justice, giving it the focus I have demonstrated how local culture effects and 
reflects local practices of justice. Moore, an American legal anthropologist who did 
fieldwork in India, noted about an insight about the functioning of the so called 
traditional system: “In the village council, a dispute is seen as part of the 
environment from which it grew. The individuals, their families, the community and 
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the histories that led to the discord are on trial”. (Moore 1985: 6). No rishwat is paid 
out, but what is paid homage is kinship; biradari and the social status of the 
disputants are taken into consideration at the time of making a decision.  
 
 It may be interesting to note that complaints of false oaths and cooked up 
stories by witnesses in the village are very rare. If someone does this s/he will 
become notorious for this. No one will trust such a person in the future. There is a 
general tendency to avoid taking an oath when making a statement such as swearing 
by the holy Quran, or swearing in the mosque, for example, even if one is telling the 
truth. I have reported in an earlier publication (2006) that a man named Aziz was 
blamed for stealing irrigation water. The panchayat decided that either Ali Ahmad, 
an uncle of Aziz, or his eldest brother living in Islamabad, should give a nian 
(swearing by entering the mosque or specified otherwise on somebody’s behalf) for 
Aziz that he had not stolen the water. If the nian was not provided, Aziz would have 
to pay ten thousand Pakistani rupees (the equivalent of 140 dollars) as a fine. The 
matter was resolved when the eldest brother of Aziz came and straight away paid the 
ten thousands rupees (so opposed the family to providing a nian, but as he did so he 
called down the punishment of God on the accusers. He said in a loud and clear 
voice: “God be my witness if my brother had stolen the water this money should be 
good for them, and if my brother is innocent, which I have made sure he is, then this 
hard earned money should destroy the accusers”. Having said this he left. The other 
family was so terrified that they immediately returned the money. 
 
 Cases of telling lies in the panchayats are rare, perhaps because in a village 
everybody knows everyone’s business, almost everything that happens I would add 
that there is no need of false testimonies in local councils because their decisions are 
anyway compromises arrived at according to the local values of kinship and 
inequality. The situation is very different in the courts and with the police however. 
Moon, a colonial administrator, wrote in the beginning of the 20th century of his 
experiences with the courts: “(…) Indian magistrates daily spent hours in their courts 
solemnly recording word for word the evidence of illiterate peasants, knowing fully 
well that 90 percent of it was false. Even if the events described had actually 
occurred the alleged eye-witnesses had not seen them.” (Moon 1930: 51).  
 
 This statement is as true today as it was at that time. As has been mentioned 
above this is such a contrast to the practices in the village where people seldom if 
ever tell a lie after invoking the Quran or other holy objects. Important to mention is 
that in the courts too witnesses have to swear not to tell a lie. Moon has reported at 
length of a murder in a village where an innocent person was hanged due to false 
eye-witness accounts. All this had happened in spite of the fact that the magistrate 
knew this as well as also all the people of the village. (1930: 44-51). The Law 
Reforms Commissions also made no secret of this problem in their reports. I have 
already written in detail how the magistrates, judges, lawyers, serving staff, police 
accept money.  
 
 The police may be called one of the most corrupt departments of the Pakistani 
State. The Law Reform Commissions formed by governments of Pakistan wrote: 
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“…, police station is the main centre of corrupt activities (…). A case is 
not registered or an F.I.R. is not accepted nor is sufficient interest 
shown in the investigation unless the complainant gives a handsome 
gratification to Officer-in-Charge of the police stations or Station 
House Officers. If the accused party is more generous, the scales are 
invariably tipped in its favour. Both the parties are often kept equally 
satisfied by a clever investigating officer who sends the cases up to the 
Court of Magistrate with such lacunae therein that the accused may 
make capital out of them.” (Law Reform Commission 1967-70: 414). 
 
 The first necessary step in the criminal justice is the registration of a so called 
FIR (First Investigation Report), which is not written without safarish and rishwat as 
has been noted in the quotation above. Though, theoretically, an FIR is just a 
verbatim report of the grieved party written by the police scribe, called a muharer. 
But in practice villagers who cannot pay the bribe or lack the backing of an 
influential relative or patron are denied this right. The police in general are very 
crude and use foul and abusive language. Among the villagers fear of the police is 
immense and so most simple and honest people avoid contact to them.  
 
 When two goats of G. Mustafa, son of Hamid, a farmer from the village, were 
stolen one night he did not even consider going to the police. As soon as he 
discovered that his goats had been stolen he told his father, brothers, neighbors, and 
friends. The thieves had also broken into the house of a neighbor who lived a few 
houses away and stole some sacks of wheat from their adjacent shop. Two khojees 
(trackers) from the neighboring village were called in to track the thieves, and they 
tracked the footprints of one of the thieves to the house of Ummar Draz who lived in 
the same village as Mustaf.  Umar Draz was a mussali – in English known as 
Muslim sheikh: traditionally servants of the farmers who are at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy in the village. Umar Draz and his sons herd sheep and goats. Aziz 
the younger brother of Mustafa had beaten up a son of Umar Draz for damaging the 
crops by letting animals into the crops in spite of being repeatedly warned not to do 
so. Umar Draz had the backing of Gulzar, another fellow villager who belonged to a 
strong family and had old scores to settle with Hamid and his sons. In a village 
panchayat (council of village elders) Umar Draz, with the backing of Gulzar, refused 
to cooperate with khojees’s trial. The case shifted from the village to the police.  
 
Mustafa knew that the cheapest, easiest and perhaps most pragmatic approach would 
be to forget about the two stolen goats and go back to routine life. He was aware of 
the fact that he was never going to see his stolen goats again. Asking for police 
assistance and starting a court case would mean wasting of a lot of time and money, 
much more than the stolen goats were worth. But then he pointed out that the thieves 
may take this as an easy ride and steal other animals or goods in future. Besides that 
he would loose his honour in the eyes of his fellow villagers, especially because 
Umar Draz, a mussali, had challenged him. For Gulzar, if Umar Draz looses it 
wouldn’t be such a loss of honour because he was only indirectly involved. In a win 
Gulzar wins, but in case of a loss Umar Draz would. It would not be a big deal for 
Umar Draz himself because it wouldn’t be such a loss of honour to lose to a farmer. 
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Two months had gone by since Mustaf’s goats were stolen, and he had been running 
from pillar to the post, and an FIR had yet not been registered. 
 
 FIRs are generally denied, delayed, exaggerated and falsely constructed for 
money and safarish (nepotism). Every police station has a scribe called muharer 
whose is responsible for writing an FIR, but it is not written until ordered by the 
Station House Officer (SHO). Both parties try their level best to get an FIR 
registered or to obstruct it. The amount of bribery depends upon the nature of the 
case and the parties involved. There are touts in every village, and at the police 
station some of them are junior and retired police officers. Registration of an FIR 
itself is celebrated as a great success. In case of its denial it is a great achievement 
for the opponents. The police are happy with every case and with crime in their area 
generally because it brings them money. Not a single job, however small, is done by 
the police without a certain fee or safarish – even for attesting the character 
certificates necessary for a job or a passport. At the police station the policemen do 
not hesitate asking the complainants to bring cigarettes, tea, food, telephone cards, 
paper and pen for writing, etc. In case of arresting an accused person the 
complainant is asked to come very early in the morning with a car, arrange food and 
refreshments, and the like. It is not a wonder that a vast majority of villagers dream 
of their children becoming thanidars (generally meaning SHO). But again, all this is 
required if there is no safarish.  
 
 Gulzar is an influential farmer who is often in touch with the police. His 
brothers work in the nearby town. The present SHO is known to them. When 
Mustafa went to the police station he was accompanied by Asghar, an ex-policeman 
from the village and also a very distant relative. Mustafa was asked to pay ten 
thousands for an FIR, which he refused to do. Hamid contacted Murtaza, the son of 
his sister living in Islamabad. Murtaza is a rather well connected person. In his office 
he entertains and helps his friends, colleagues and juniors. One of his close friends is 
working in the Ministry of Interior at a senior position. He called the relevant 
District Police Officer (DPO) on behalf of Murtaza and asked him to help his friend. 
The situation changed completely. The case was shifted from the police station to the 
district headquarters, and an assistant superintendent of police (ASP) was given 
charge of the case. Mustafa nominated the important members of the other side, and 
they were asked to give a nian (declaring with one hand on the Quran) swearing that 
the accused is innocent. The nominated people refused, and Umar Draz seemed to be 
in trouble.  
 Arif bought a second hand Toyota Corolla 1986 model from Hameed and 
Yousaf khichy, an occasional customer at his brother’s shop. About one week after 
the purchase it was discovered that it was a stolen car. Arif filed a court case against 
the police and the proclaimed car owner for a so called stay order. Arif and his 
brothers, through a far relative, approached the police officer in charge of the car 
lifting cell. This police officer found a very interesting legal solution. The police 
officially took away the car from Arif (as it was a stolen car), but then they gave it 
back to Arif through the process of the court pending the court’s final decision. The 
police got five thousand Pakistani rupees for this. In the court Arif hired one of the 
best lawyers, who in a very clever way had the case linger in court for a very long 
time. The other party lost hope and gave up following the court case. The court 
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decided in favor of Arif and his family because the other party was absent. It was 
definitely a fake (stolen) car, as this was also proved by a laboratory test. The head 
of the car lifting cell said privately that there are gangs of thieves who operate with 
the help of the police. The end of the story is even more interesting. One evening 
when the car was parked at a public place, the officers of excise came and 
confiscated the car claiming that no taxes have been paid on it. Arif tried to pay the 
bribe, but the price was higher than the actual price of that car, and so he didn’t pay 
the bribe. 
 
 In another case involving a man named Khuram, his new car, a Suzuki 
Khyber, was stolen from outside his house one evening. An FIR was written after 
hectic efforts to obtain one. In the first few days he visited the police station every 
day, then every second day, and finally he gave up the hope. In the meantime friends 
and acquaintances told him about people in the tribal areas who buy original papers 
of stolen cars or sell cars with tempered chassis numbers. The brother-in-law of 
Khuram had links to the commissioner of that district. The commissioner asked one 
of his juniors to help Khuram. This gentleman told him to get a car on “spurd dari” 
(custody) from the cars at the police stolen car lot.  Instead of this Khuram paid fifty 
thousand Pakistani rupees (around six hundred dollars) and got a car from the stolen 
car lot which had some similarities to his own stolen car. The police had already 
destroyed most of the identity marks of car, like the chaises number, etc. The police 
off course justified the charging of money on the grounds that they spend money 
from their own pockets to chase criminals because of the lack of funds for such 
purposes.  
 
About corruption in the courts Hoebel wrote:  
 
“Below the level of the High Courts all is corruption. Neither the facts 
nor the law in the case have any real bearing on the outcome. It all 
depends on who you know, who has influence and where you put your 
money.” (Hoebel 1965: 45) 
 
 One big problem at the courts is delay. All people who are related to criminal 
justice like the lawyers, the judges, the police, the legal process serving staff, etc. all 
are responsible for the delay. The Law Reform Commission noted: 
 
“There is a wide-spread complaint that criminal cases are generally 
delayed inordinately by some magistrates with a view to extracting 
illegal gratification. …, ‘oiling of the wheels’ is necessary make even 
the judicial machinery run smoothly and with speed at this level.” (Law 
Reform Commission 1967-70: 414-15). 
 
 The same report records 54 adjournments in one case and 29 adjournments in 
another case (1967-70: 186). At another stage the Law Reform Commission wrote: 
 
“(…) we were surprised to find that services of a senior lawyer 
practicing mainly in that court could not be effected for about a year on 
the plea that he was not available even though he was attending the 
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court almost every day and appearing in cases occasionally even before 
the judge-in-charge of the Nazarat.” (Law Reform Commission 1967-
70: 415) 
 
 It is not only judges, lawyers and police that are corrupt; all those who are 
affiliated with courts and or have anything to do with the courts work either after 
charging money or having been approached by friends, relatives or influential 
people.  
 
“…, corruption among the subordinate officials and process-serving 
staff as well as among the investigating staff is rampant with the result 
that no action is taken by them unless the parties involved approach 
them and tender some extra-legal consideration. …, ‘papers move only 
on golden or silver wheels’.” (Law Reform Commission 1967-70: 414-
15). 
 
 It is perhaps not out of place to mention that almost identical corrupt practices 
have been observed in India by anthropologists and jurists who have written on this 
issue (for comparison see Helmken 1976, Cohn 1967, Moore 1985, 1993). The 
similarity is so striking that if only the names of places and the country are switched 
it would be difficult to differentiate between the two countries. Another observation 
to mention in this regard is that corruption did not start after partition. It started 
almost the same day as the British-styled system of justice was introduced in the 
sub-continent. Moon’s small book is a very good record of corrupt practices in 
Indian courts during the British colonial rule. Moon wrote: 
 
“It was amazing (…) that anything so unsuited (…) as the English law 
should even have been foisted upon India (…) a monstrous injustice 
that Indians should be subjected to laws designed for quite different 
social conditions (…) (Moon 1930: 52-4). 
 
He wrote further:  
 
“(…) people had become habituated to systematized perjury, had been 
corrupted by unscrupulous lawyers, had been taught to flock to the law 
courts and to revel in the tainted atmosphere of bribery and chicanery 
that surrounds them. Litigation had become a national pastime and the 
criminal law a recognized and well-tried means of harassing, 
imprisoning and even hanging one’s enemies” (Moon 1930: 52-4). 
 
 We do not see any difference between the pre-partition situation described by 
Moon and the post partition situation in India and Pakistan described by so many 
authors. Cohn and Moore explained corruption in the courts as follows: “The way a 
people settle disputes is part of its social structure and value system. In attempting to 
introduce British procedural law into their Indian courts, the British confronted the 
Indians with a situation in which there was a direct clash of the values of the two 
societies; ” (Cohn 1967: 154) Moore wrote likewise: “The British system, (…) 
examines one distinct dispute under ‘laboratory conditions’. (…) In theory, the 
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disputants lose their social status and are viewed equals before the law” (Moore 
1986: 6). But the situation on ground is that “(…) men are not born equal, and they 
have widely differing inherent worth” (Cohn 1967:155). As a contrast, “In the 
village council, a dispute is seen as part of the environment from which it grew. The 
individuals, their families, the community and the histories that led to the discord are 
on trial.” (Moore 1986: 6).  
 
 Summary of my argument is that human beings have an inherent unequal 
worth in the Punjabi culture. While making decisions at local institutions this worth 
which may also be called status and position locally known as izzat (honour) is kept 
in mind. In other words, laws are not same or laws are applied by keeping in mind 
the position of people involved. There is no corruption in the sense of payment of 
money at this level. The official justice system theoretically follows the ideals of 
equality i.e. same laws for all and all are equal before law. The implementers of law 
(police and court officials) are part of the Punjabi society and culture. These officials 
believe in local culture rather than follow the laws. As a matter of fact money is 
received and above all paid which influences the implementation of law. The result 
is that the official justice system as it is practiced produces results which are similar 
if not same as the traditional system. Therefore, I say corruption is paid to achieve 
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